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Abstract 
It has been suggested that attention is guided by two factors that operate during associative 
learning: a predictiveness principle, by which attention is allocated to the best predictors of 
outcomes, and an uncertainty principle, by which attention is allocated to learn about the 
less-known features of the environment. Recent studies have shown that predictiveness-
driven attention can operate rapidly and in an automatic way to exploit known 
relationships. The corresponding characteristics of uncertainty-driven attention, on the 
other hand, remain unexplored. In two experiments we examined whether both 
predictiveness and uncertainty modulate attentional processing in an adaptation of the dot 
probe task. This task provides a measure of automatic orientation to cues during associative 
learning. The stimulus-onset-asynchrony of the probe display was manipulated in order to 
explore temporal characteristics of predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional 
effects. Results showed that the predictive status of cues determined selective attention, 
with faster attentional capture to predictive than to nonpredictive cues. In contrast, the 
level of uncertainty slowed down responses to the probe regardless of the predictive status 
of the cues. Both predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional effects were very rapid 
(at 250 ms from cue onset) and automatically activated.  
Keywords: attention, associative learning, dot probe, predictiveness, uncertainty.  
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Visual attention determines which stimuli are preferentially processed. It allows for 
the focusing of limited cognitive resources on important aspects of the environment, to the 
detriment of processing less important information. Thus, in order to understand our 
cognitive system, it is crucial to investigate which factors modulate this selection process. 
These factors are usually divided into two mutually exclusive functional categories according 
to whether attentional modulation is caused by physical characteristics of the stimuli (i.e., 
stimulus-driven modulation) or is caused by cognitive factors such as goal-directed 
intentions or motivations (i.e., goal-directed modulation) (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Yantis, 2000). For example, when driving we might use goal-directed, top-down attention to 
prioritize processing of events on the road ahead, and to ignore conversation from the 
backseat. But a physically salient event (e.g., a sudden bang from behind the car) will 
capture our attention in an bottom-up, stimulus-driven fashion regardless of our goals (e.g., 
Theeuwes, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). 
However, it has recently been argued that there is a third category of influences on 
attentional selection that is neither fully goal-directed nor stimulus-driven, and which comes 
into play when people have had previous experience with stimuli. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that our attention is influenced by what we have learned about how stimuli 
relate to other events in the environment (Anderson, 2013; Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2012; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & 
Beesley, 2015; Le Pelley, Beesley, & Griffiths, in press; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & 
Wills, in press). 
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While the suggestion of a relationship between learning and attention has received 
a great deal of recent interest, it is not a new idea. William James (1890/1983) wrote about 
derived attention: a form of attention to a stimulus that “owes its interest to association 
with some other immediately interesting thing” (p. 393). More importantly for current 
purposes, models of associative learning proposed over the last 40 years provide formal 
accounts of how learning and attention might interact (see Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). 
These models were developed largely on the basis of the results of studies of animal 
conditioning, but have since been applied to explain behaviour in studies of human learning. 
Such ‘attentional models’ of associative learning propose that the attention that is paid to a 
stimulus is influenced by the certainty or uncertainty of the predictions that it makes about 
other events. 
In the associative learning literature, uncertainty is understood as the variance in 
the nature or magnitude of the outcome which follows a cue or an operant behaviour 
(Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). For instance, imagine an urn containing red balls and yellow 
balls. If the urn contains 50% red balls and 50% yellow balls, then the uncertainty about the 
colour of a randomly drawn ball will be greater than if the urn contained 80% red and 20% 
yellow. At the limit, if the urn contained only red balls, the uncertainty would be zero.  
As noted above, attentional models of associative learning describe how 
uncertainty might influence which cue stimuli receive attentional priority for future learning. 
For example, according to the influential model of associative learning proposed by 
Mackintosh (1975), it is those cues that are the most reliable predictors of significant events 
in the environment (i.e., those cues that most consistently and accurately predict the events 
that follow them) that will receive the greatest amount of attentional processing. We term 
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this a predictiveness-driven principle for guiding attention. Phrased in terms of the 
uncertainty associated with cues, this model states that those cues that have, in the past, 
had more uncertain consequences will tend to receive less attention compared to more 
reliable cues that are presented alongside them. Thus, the Mackintosh model captures the 
selective nature of attention, in that it sees the learning system as seeking out the most 
reliable sources of information. Such attentional biases favouring certain over uncertain 
sources of information have been shown widely in the human and animal learning literature 
(for reviews, see Le Pelley, 2004, 2010; Le Pelley, Mitchell et al., in press; Pearce & 
Mackintosh, 2010).  
However, when interacting with the world, our aim is not only to obtain well-
predicted and reliable outcomes or rewards, but also to gather further information about 
the environment and hence reduce uncertainty. That is, adapted intelligent animals (and 
machine learning systems) devote time and effort towards exploring their environment (e.g, 
Oudeyer, Kaplan, & Hafner, 2007). The attentional system may have an important role to 
play as part of this uncertainty-reduction process (see Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 
2013). Consistent with this idea, computational modelling suggests that complementing a 
predictiveness-driven attentional process with an exploratory attentional mechanism might 
be an optimal information-processing strategy (e.g., Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000). 
This uncertainty-driven attentional process is exemplified by the Pearce and Hall (1980) 
model of associative learning. According to this model, cues for which prediction errors have 
recently occurred (i.e., cues whose consequences are highly variable and hence uncertain), 
will attract more attention than certain cues (i.e., cues for which prediction errors have 
recently been minimal). Uncertainty-driven attention was proposed originally as a 
mechanism by which resource optimization is achieved. This is because uncertainty-driven 
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attention assigns most cognitive resources to processing those stimuli whose predictive 
status is currently poorly understood, which may be adaptive, since it may allow the true 
status of those cues to be clarified (Pearce & Hall, 1980). In addition, it has been pointed out 
that, even considering an unlimited processor, exploratory attention would be necessary in 
order to avoid local minima in the solution to learning tasks (Dayan et al., 2000). Suppose a 
predator learns that a particular type of abundant yellow beetle makes a tasty meal. If this 
predator used an exploitative attentional strategy, it would subsequently hunt exclusively 
for yellow beetles, and ignore other potential sources of food (say, somewhat rarer red 
spiders) that may also be palatable (Bond & Kamil, 1998). But the availability of different 
prey can change over time. Suppose that, for some reason, the once-abundant yellow 
beetles become less common than red spiders. Our ‘pure exploitation’ predator would now 
be at a disadvantage, since it would remain hunting for a scarce resource when an easier 
alternative is available. In contrast, a predator that occasionally changes its foraging strategy 
and explores other potential prey items (about which it is currently uncertain) would rapidly 
learn to increase its reliance on red spiders, and may thus be more likely to thrive. 
Animal experimentation has shown results consistent with the operation of 
uncertainty-driven attention (Haselgrove, Esber, Pearce, & Jones, 2010; Kaye & Pearce, 
1984a; Swan & Pearce, 1988; Wilson, Boumphrey, & Pearce, 1992), and the neural basis of 
this mechanism has been delimited to critical involvement of the prefrontal and amygdala 
regions (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Roesch, Esber, Li, Daw, & Schoenbaum, 2012). 
There are also experiments (though not many) which support a role for uncertainty-driven 
attention in human causal learning tasks (Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson, & Le Pelley, 2015; 
Griffiths, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2011; Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008; for a 
review, see Le Pelley, Mitchell et al, in press). 
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From a theoretical point of view, predictiveness-driven and uncertainty-driven 
attentional processes are not necessarily exclusive. Indeed, modern attentional models of 
associative learning have strived to incorporate both principles, either in so-called ‘hybrid’ 
or dual-process models (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010), or in a flexible 
single-process account (Esber & Haselgrove, 2011). Supporting this view, Beesley et al. 
(2015) showed that overt attention to stimuli (measured via eye-tracking) could be 
determined by both predictiveness and uncertainty within the same task. These 
experiments used a learned predictiveness design (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Lochmann & 
Wills, 2003) in which, on each trial, participants were presented with a compound of two 
cues and had to predict which outcome would occur following that compound; corrective 
feedback was provided. Only one cue from each pair (the predictive cue) was informative of 
the outcome, while the other cue was nonpredictive, since it was paired with each of the 
two outcomes equally often. When eye-gaze dwell times to predictive and nonpredictive 
cues were analysed, results complied with the predictiveness-driven principle; people spent 
longer looking at predictive cues than nonpredictive cues (see also Le Pelley, Beesley, & 
Griffiths, 2011). Beesley et al. also manipulated the uncertainty of each compound. In the 
certain condition, each compound had a deterministic relationship with its paired outcome 
(that is, the same outcome always followed a particular compound), such that participants 
experienced minimal prediction errors once the contingencies were learned. In contrast, for 
the uncertain condition, compound–outcome relationships were probabilistic (that is, each 
compound was typically, but not always, followed by one of the outcomes) and so 
occasional prediction errors were inevitable, even after asymptotic learning. Dwell-time 
analysis revealed that participants spent a greater proportion of the trial time attending to 
the cues in uncertain compounds as compared to cues in certain compounds, regardless of 
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the predictive status (predictive/nonpredictive) of those cues; i.e., a main effect of 
uncertainty, but no interaction between uncertainty and predictiveness. Thus, Beesley et 
al.’s results suggest that predictiveness-driven attention determines the selection of the 
most predictive stimulus from the environment, while uncertainty-driven attention reflects 
a mechanism which prioritises exploration of cues when recent prediction errors have been 
experienced.  
The current article concerns the nature of the attentional processes underlying 
predictiveness-driven and uncertainty-driven attention. Recent research suggests that 
learning can exert an effect on attentional capture by stimuli that is rapid and automatic, in 
the sense that it occurs regardless of task demands and participants’ ongoing goals (see 
Anderson, 2013; Awh et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Le Pelley et al. 2015; Le Pelley, 
Mitchell et al., in press). These previous studies considered the influence of learning about 
the value of rewards paired with stimuli (so-called value-driven attentional capture). In the 
experiments reported here, we investigated whether this pattern of rapid and automatic 
capture also applies to changes in attention that are driven by learning about the variability 
of outcomes paired with stimuli, in terms of predictiveness and uncertainty. 
Toward this end, we explored the influence of predictiveness and uncertainty on 
attention using a variant of the spatial cueing task (Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978). 
Specifically, we used an adaptation of the dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986), which we have previously used to study the operation of predictiveness-driven 
attentional processes during associative learning (Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013). In the 
current experiments, participants were initially trained on an associative learning (AL) task: 
on each trial, two cues were presented on the screen and participants made a 
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categorization response (does this pair of cues belong to the ‘up’ category or the ‘down’ 
category?), with immediate corrective feedback provided. Later, a dot probe task was 
superimposed on this AL task. Now when the two cues were presented on each trial, 
participants first had to respond as rapidly as possible to a probe stimulus that appeared 
over one cue (with equal likelihood of the probe appearing on either of the two cues), 
before subsequently making a categorization response as part of the AL task, just as before. 
Critically, this procedure allowed us to manipulate the predictiveness and uncertainty of 
cues and compounds in the AL task, and observe the resulting influence on attention to cues 
through response times on the dot probe task. That is, if the contingencies in the AL task 
were such as to cause participants to selectively attend to one cue over the other, then 
responses to the probe stimulus should have been faster if it appeared in the location of the 
attended cue compared to its counterpart (cf. MacLeod et al, 1986; Posner et al., 1978). 
Varying the timing of the probe onset allowed us to examine the time-course of attentional 
orienting and disengagement of attention to cues as a function of their predictiveness and 
uncertainty.  
Using such a task, Le Pelley et al. (2013) showed that responses to the probe were 
faster when it appeared in the location of a predictive cue than a nonpredictive cue, if the 
probe appeared rapidly after cue-onset (with a stimulus-onset asynchrony [SOA] of 250-350 
ms). Crucially, since the probe was equally likely to occur in the position of the predictive 
and nonpredictive cue, there was no advantage to be gained in directing greater attention 
to one type of cue than the other, prior to the probe presentation. Indeed, participants 
were explicitly informed that in order to respond to the probe as quickly as possible, their 
best strategy was to ignore the initially presented cues. Since attentional bias towards 
predictive cues was not required by the dot probe task or indeed an adaptive strategy with 
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regard to that task, the implication is that the observed bias reflected the operation of a 
process independent of participants’ goal for this task (i.e., to localize the probe as quickly 
as possible). Consistent with this idea, Le Pelley et al. (2013) demonstrated that providing 
more time for participants to consciously process the stimuli—by increasing the SOA on dot 
probe trials to 1000 ms—significantly weakened the influence of predictiveness on dot 
probe responding. This supports the idea that the bias towards predictive cues observed in 
the short SOA condition was not a result of goal-directed, controlled processing but instead 
an automatic, rapid, and short-lived attentional process within the region of 250 
milliseconds after cue-onset (for convergent evidence, see Feldmann-Wüstefeld, Uengoer, 
& Schubö, 2015).1 
The current experiments examined whether manipulations of uncertainty also 
influence attentional processing in the dot probe task, and hence whether this influence 
reflects a rapid and automatic process. It might be expected that in contrast to the 
predictiveness factor, uncertainty promotes the engagement of a more controlled, goal-
directed process: Pearce and Hall (1980) described an uncertainty-driven increase in 
attention in their model as reflecting a “controlled processing strategy” (Pearce &Hall, 1980, 
p. 549, italics in original). Yet to date, this suggestion of a processing distinction between 
attentional processes remains untested in the human (or animal) associative learning 
literature. 
The current experiments explored attention to cues during associative learning 
with designs that follow Beesley et al. (2015) in simultaneously manipulating the level of 
uncertainty for compounds of cues and the level of predictiveness of cues within each 
compound. Beesley et al.’s experiments did not permit an examination of whether 
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uncertainty-driven effects were produced by automatic and/or controlled changes in covert 
attention, since the time-course of participants’ gaze was not assessed. By using the dot-
probe task, the current experiments examine the time-course of attention by varying the 
SOA between presentation of the cues and appearance of the probe as a within-subject 
variable. Thus, the current experiments go beyond the experiments of Beesley et al. in 
providing an examination of the automatic/controlled nature of uncertainty-driven 
attention.  
If uncertainty-driven attention reflects a controlled, goal-directed process (for 
instance, as a consequence of a volitional effort to find new information so as to minimize 
errors in the AL task), we should not necessarily expect to observe an influence of 
uncertainty (defined with regard to the AL task) on rapid responses to the dot probe, since 
participants have ample time to freely explore the cues following their dot probe response. 
In contrast, if uncertainty-driven attention is rapid and automatic (as seems to be the case 
for value-driven and predictiveness-driven attention), the manipulation of uncertainty 
would be expected to affect the responses to the dot probe. However, the specific pattern 
to be anticipated under this latter hypothesis is unclear. For instance, it is possible that 
uncertain cues may initiate a general increase in arousal or vigilance and hence decreased 
response times to probes. On the other hand, it may also be possible that uncertainty 
produces a rapid and automatic exploratory examination of the cues, in search of new 
information that will assist in reducing prediction error. Such diffuse deployment of 
attention may hinder the localization of the probe and hence result in increased response 
times in the dot probe task under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 09
:14
 13
 M
ay
 20
16
 
12 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and apparatus. For both experiments, we guided our decision on sample sizes 
using estimates from Le Pelley et al.’s (2013) Experiment 2, which is the closest existing 
procedure to the current experiments. Since we expected to replicate the predictiveness 
result found by Le Pelley et al. in their short SOA condition, we took the effect size from this 
condition for the current power analysis. The effect size from this experiment was η୮ଶ  = .07; 
considering that effect size, the needed sample for a power of 0.8 is 21 participants. Thus, 
we aimed to achieve 20-25 valid cases per SOA condition after the application of our 
rejection criteria (see above).  
Based on our experience with this type of task, we estimated that around 3/4 of all 
participants would pass our rejection criterion. In order to achieve 20-25 valid cases per 
condition, seventy UNSW Australia students participated for course credit in the Experiment 
1. Participants were randomly allocated to either the 250ms or 1000ms SOA conditions. 
They were tested in individual enclosed cubicles, using standard PCs with 58.4 cm monitors 
(1920 × 1080 resolution, 120 Hz), at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. Stimulus 
presentation was controlled by the Cogent 2000 toolbox (Cogent 2000 team, Wellcome 
Trust, London, UK) running under MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.). Participants made all 
responses with their right hand, using the arrow keys of custom keyboards which provide 
average response latencies of around 1 millisecond (DirectIN keyboard, Empirisoft, New 
York). 
Stimuli.  Cues were eight coloured polygons, which differed in colour and the thickness of 
their ‘spikes’ (see Figure 1B). Colours (RGB) and relative luminance (on a 255-level scale) for 
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colours were as follows: red (R255, G0, B0; L54), yellow (R230, G230, B51; L217), green (R0, 
G204, B51; L150), turquoise (R51, G255, B255; L212), blue (R0, G128, B255; L110), magenta 
(R255, G51, B255; L109), brown (R153, G102, B0; L105), and salmon (R255, G128, B128; 
L155). The polygon shapes were framed by white squares with sides subtending 4.7° visual 
angle. For each participant these stimuli were randomly assigned to play the roles of the 
various cues shown in Table 1. The cue stimuli were presented on the horizontal midline of 
the screen, on either side of a small, central fixation cross. The distance from the centre of 
the cross to the centre of each square subtended 4.7°. The probe was a white square which 
subtended 0.67°. This appeared superimposed centrally on one of the stimuli. The screen 
background was black. 
Design.  The experiment contained three phases (see Table 1): the Pretraining phase 
established the cue–outcome contingencies in the absence of the dot probe task; Phase 1 
continued training these cue–outcome contingencies in the presence of the dot probe task; 
and Phase 2 involved a manipulation of the uncertainty of the relationships between 
compounds of cues and the outcomes with which they were paired. 
For the associative learning (AL) task in Pretraining and Phase 1, participants were 
required to make either an up or down categorization response on each trial; Table 1 shows 
the correct response to each of the eight cue-compounds that were presented. Each 
compound contained one predictive cue (labelled p1, p2, p3 and p4 in Table 1) and one 
nonpredictive cue (labelled n1, n2, n3 and n4). As can be seen in Table 1, predictive cues 
consistently indicated the correct categorization response during these phases; for instance, 
whenever p1 appeared, the correct response was always response R1 (up or down, 
counterbalanced across participants). Thus, once the contingencies were learned, the 
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participants could make these responses accurately using only the information provided by 
the predictive cues and therefore perfectly predict the correct response on each trial. In 
contrast, nonpredictive cues provided no information regarding the correct response (e.g., 
for half of the appearances of n1 the correct response was R1, for the other half it was R2, 
see Table 1), and therefore the outcome could not be anticipated using these nonpredictive 
cues alone. 
The left/right positions in which cues appeared was counterbalanced within each 
block. Hence each block of the Pretraining phase contained two presentations of each of the 
eight compounds shown in Table 1, one with the predictive stimulus on the left and one 
with the predictive stimulus on the right. This resulted in 16 trials per block and the 
Pretraining phase involved four such blocks. 
The dot probe task was superimposed on the AL task in Phase 1. We needed to 
ensure that the probe was equally likely to appear over either cue of each compound (e.g., 
that the probe was equally likely to appear over cue p1 as it was to appear over cue n1), 
such that there was no reason for participants to strategically orient attention to one or 
other cue prior to the appearance of the probe. Consequently, each block of Phase 1 
comprised 32 trials: every combination of the 8 compounds, the left/right positioning of 
cues, and the left/right location of the probe. Trials within a block were presented in a 
random order. There were eight such blocks in Phase 1.  
Four compounds were presented in Phase 2, again with the left/right position of 
the cues and left/right location of the probe counterbalanced. In addition to these factors 
we also manipulated uncertainty. During Phase 2, each of the four compounds shown in 
Table 1 was presented 24 times. For the uncertain compounds, on 16 of these 24 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 09
:14
 13
 M
ay
 20
16
 
15 
 
presentations (67%) the correct response was consistent with the response that had been 
correct for that compound during Phase 1, while on the remaining 8 trials (33%) the correct 
response was inconsistent with prior training. Within the consistent and inconsistent trial 
types, cue and probe location were counterbalanced, as before. For the certain compounds, 
the correct response was always consistent with the correct response in Phase 1. Trial order 
was randomized. 
The SOA of the probe (250 or 1000 ms) was manipulated between-subjects, and 
the same SOA applied throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
Procedure. Initial instructions described the AL task: participants were told that on each trial 
a pair of stimuli would appear and that they were required to make a response using either 
the up or down arrow key. They were informed that their task was to learn the correct 
response for each stimulus pair. Participants then completed the Pretraining phase. Each 
trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross, followed after 500 ms by two 
cue stimuli. One second after the presentation of the cues, the text ‘UP or DOWN?’ 
appeared centred on the screen in the space between the two cues (30-point Arial font for 
the words ‘UP’ and ‘DOWN, 20-point for the word ‘or’). This way, the cues were still visible 
even with the text on the screen. Participants made a categorization response using the up 
or down arrow keys and this response was allowed only when the words ‘UP or DOWN?’ 
were on the screen. If the response was correct, no explicit feedback was provided and the 
next trial began after an inter-trial interval of 1s. If the response was incorrect, then the 
message ‘incorrect’ appeared for 3s, followed by the inter-trial interval. Participants could 
take as long as they liked to make the categorisation response in all phases.  
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Instructions prior to Phase 1 stated that participants would now have to perform an 
additional task on each trial, which was to respond as rapidly as possible to the location of a 
small white square, using the left and right arrow keys. Figure 1A shows a schematic of a 
typical trial in Phases 1 and 2. After an initial fixation interval of 500 ms, the two cues 
appeared. Then, after an SOA of 250 ms (short SOA condition) or 1000 ms (long SOA 
condition), the probe appeared, superimposed on the centre of one of the cues. This probe 
remained on-screen until participants made the correct response (left arrow key for a probe 
presented on the left; right arrow key for a probe on the right). Immediately after making 
the correct response to the location of the probe, the probe disappeared and participants 
made their categorization response as before. The cues were visible for the duration of the 
trial (see Figure 1A). Participants were told that in order to respond to the white square (the 
probe) as quickly as possible, the best strategy was to ignore the coloured polygons until 
after they had made their left/right response to the square. Specifically, this instruction was 
as follows: “Try to respond to the square as fast as you can. To do so, it is best if you ignore 
the two figures until you have responded to the location of the square” (the instructions 
also showed the text underlined). Participants completed the experiment in a single 45-
minute session. 
 
Results and discussion 
Data pre-processing. Averaged across all participants, accuracy on the AL task increased 
during training and reached a high level by the end of Phase 1 (see Figure 1D). Since our 
results in Phase 2 depended on appropriate acquisition of the associative contingencies in 
Phase 1, participants who performed with less than 60% accuracy during the final three 
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blocks of Phase 1 were removed from the analysis. As a consequence of this criterion, the 
data from sixteen participants were not analysed further (final sample, N = 54, with 27 in 
each SOA condition). 
For the analysis of dot probe RTs we adopted a pre-processing pipeline very similar 
to that used by Le Pelley et al. (2013, Experiments 2 and 3). Since the dot-probe task 
provided no explicit feedback on response accuracy, trials in which an incorrect response 
was made at any point during the presentation of the probe were not analysed (1% of all 
trials); nor were trials in which responses were very fast (under 150 ms) or very slow (over 
1000 ms) (5% of all trials). Finally, as a guard against within-participant outliers, trials with 
RTs to the probe lying more than 2.5 standard deviations from each participant’s mean were 
also excluded from analysis (1% of the remaining trials).  
Statistical analyses. All tests were performed at the α = 0.05 significance level. For 
repeated-measures ANOVA, Greenhouse-Geisser alpha correction was applied when 
necessary. 
Dot probe task: Response time. Figure 2 shows RTs to the probe averaged across blocks for 
Phases 1 and 2. Regarding the Phase 1 results, a 2 (SOA: short vs. long) × 2 (Predictiveness: 
probe on predictive cue vs. probe on nonpredictive cue) ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
predictiveness, F(1,52) = 6.41,  p = .014, ߟ௣ଶ = .11, and a significant predictiveness × SOA 
interaction, F(1,52) = 14.18,  p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ= .21. The main effect of SOA was not significant, 
F(1,52) = 0.21,  p = .652, ߟ௣ଶ< .01. To explore the interaction further, paired t-tests examined 
the influence of the predictiveness factor at each level of the SOA factor. These revealed 
that RTs were faster when the probe was positioned over predictive stimuli compared to 
nonpredictive stimuli at short SOA, t(26) = 4.03, p < .001, d = 0.78, but there was no 
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significant difference in performance at long SOA, t(26) = 0.99, p = .333, d = -0.19. Thus, 
predictiveness-driven attentional capture was observed when attention was measured 250 
ms after cue onset, and this effect had dissipated by 1000 ms, replicating the findings of Le 
Pelley et al. (2013).   
Probe RTs in Phase 2 were analyzed by repeated-measures ANOVA with factors of 
predictiveness, SOA, and the uncertainty associated with each compound (certain 
compounds vs. uncertain compounds). This revealed a main effect of predictiveness, F(1,52) 
= 6.96,  p = .011, ߟ௣ଶ = .12, with faster RTs when the probe appeared in the location of a 
predictive cue than a nonpredictive cue. There was also a main effect of uncertainty, F(1,52) 
= 43.89,  p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ = .46, with faster RTs to probes on trials featuring certain compounds 
than uncertain compounds. The main effect of SOA was not significant, F(1,52) = 1.75,  p = 
.191, ߟ௣ଶ = .03, and there were no significant interaction effects, all Fs(1,52) ≤ 1.92, ps ≥ .171, 
ߟ௣ଶs < 0.4. 
Dot probe task: Accuracy. We analysed accuracy in the dot probe task in order to assess 
whether the uncertainty and/or predictiveness effects detected in RTs to the probe could be 
accounted for by a speed-accuracy trade-off. In general, mean accuracy of dot probe 
responses was high (M = .990, SEM= .01). First, we assessed whether the SOA × 
predictiveness interaction for RTs in Phase 1 was produced by a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
For this, we conducted a 2 (SOA) × 2 (Predictiveness) ANOVA on the dot probe accuracy 
data. This yielded a significant main effect of SOA, F(1,52) = 5.08,  p = .028, ߟ௣ଶ = .09, but no 
significant effect of predictiveness, F(1,52) = 2.38,  p = .129, ߟ௣ଶ = .04, nor an interaction, 
F(1,52) = 0.46,  p = .499, ߟ௣ଶ< .01. The main effect of SOA was produced by less accurate 
responses in the short SOA condition (M = .987, SEM =.002) than the long SOA condition (M 
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= .992, SEM =.002). This analysis suggests that the SOA × predictiveness interaction obtained 
in the RT dependent variable during Phase 1 is not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
The same strategy was applied to the Phase 2 data. Since we obtained 
predictiveness and uncertainty main effects in the RT results, we assessed whether there 
was any difference in accuracy regarding these two independent variables. A 2 
(Predictiveness) x 2 (Uncertainty) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects nor 
interactions, all Fs < 1. Thus, none of the effects found in the RTs to the probe can be 
attributed to speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
To summarize, RTs were faster when the probe appeared in a location pre-cued by 
a predictive, rather than a nonpredictive, stimulus. During Phase 1 this effect was evident 
only in the short SOA condition, and not in the long SOA condition, replicating the effects 
obtained by Le Pelley et al. (2013). These data are therefore consistent with the idea that 
predictive stimuli elicit rapid attentional capture, but that this effect also dissipates rapidly, 
to the extent that it plays no further observable role by 1000 ms. [While the corresponding 
predictiveness × SOA interaction did not reach significance in Phase 2, we note that for the 
certain compounds (which are comparable to those experienced in Phase 1), paired t-tests 
revealed a significant effect of predictiveness at short SOAs, t(26) = 2.47, p = .020, d = 0.47, 
but not at long SOAs, t(26) = 0.02, p = .980, d < 0.01]. 
Attentional models of associative learning (e.g., Esber & Haselgrove, 2011; Le 
Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010) predict that the manipulation 
of uncertainty should affect the attention paid to uncertain compounds experienced during 
Phase 2. Experiment 1 examined the effect of any such influence of uncertainty on 
responses in the dot probe task. We observed slower responses to the probe when it was 
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pre-cued by an uncertain compound than a certain compound, and this effect did not 
interact with the length of the SOA. These data suggest that the process underpinning this 
effect of uncertainty was activated rapidly and automatically by the onset of the cues and 
persisted for at least 1000 ms [Indeed, a significant simple effect of uncertainty was evident 
in both SOA conditions: short SOA, t(26) = 6.01, p < .001, d = 1.16; long SOA, t(26) = 3.59, p = 
.001, d = 0.69]. 
The increase in response times to the probe in the uncertain condition suggests a 
modulation of attentional processing by these cues, whereby the uncertainty of the 
associated outcome decreases the attentional resources devoted to detecting the probe. 
The fact that this effect was observed in the short SOA condition indicates that the effect 
was rapidly elicited by the onset of the cues. Moreover, this effect was observed in a task 
which did not require participants to encode the identity of the cues. Cue identity was 
important only for responding on the AL task, and this response was made after participants 
had made responded to the dot probe. Indeed, participants were explicitly instructed to not 
pay attention to the two cues during the dot probe task. The finding of an effect of 
uncertainty on dot probe responding under these conditions is compatible with the 
hypothesis that uncertainty-driven attention, like predictiveness-driven attention, reflects a 
rapid process that operates independently of participants’ ongoing task goals.  We return to 
the theoretical discussion of this effect in the General Discussion, but first address possible 
alternative accounts of this key finding in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
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An alternative account of the effect of uncertainty on dot probe responding 
observed in Experiment 1 focuses on the conflict that exists between responding in the dot 
probe task and the AL task. Recall that on each trial participants responded to the position 
of the probe, and then made a choice response as to which action was correct (up or down). 
As a result of the inevitable prediction errors that would be made to the uncertain 
compounds in Phase 2, participants may have come to associate these compounds with 
both prediction responses (up and down). It is possible that these associations then led to 
greater response competition on the dot probe task: a cue associated with both up and 
down may interfere with probe responding more than a cue associated with either the up or 
down response. A further alternative account along the same lines appeals to an inhibitory 
control process. During early phases, participants may develop habitual response tendencies 
to all compounds (e.g., respond up to p1 & n1, respond down to p4 & n4, etc.). During Phase 
2, the errors that are occasionally produced by these responses for uncertain compounds 
may then lead to automatic engagement of an inhibitory process that suppresses this 
habitual tendency. Since response inhibition needs sufficient time in order to have an effect 
on controlling responses (Osman, Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986), it is likely to be advantageous 
to start the inhibition process at the moment of cue onset, and so it may well be initiated 
before the resolution of the dot probe response. Assuming that this inhibitory process 
generalizes beyond the specific response that is the intention of the inhibition (that is, it 
results—to some extent—in suppression of all responses, not just the habitual up or down 
response), it will lead to a general slowing of response times to the probe on uncertain 
trials, as observed.  
Experiment 2 was designed to minimize any influence of response interference or 
inhibition produced by uncertainty variations in the AL task on dot probe performance. 
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Observing an influence of uncertainty on dot probe responding under these conditions 
would undermine the alternative, non-attentional accounts advanced in the previous 
paragraph, and thus increase support for the account based on attentional resource re-
allocation raised in the Discussion of Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2 we reduced the response interference between the AL and the dot 
probe tasks by substantially changing the experimental procedure. First, dot probe and AL 
tasks were programmed to occur on separate and alternating trials, and participants were 
prompted about which type of task was to be completed before each trial began. Separating 
the two tasks should reduce the extent to which the AL response tendencies were activated 
by the cues during the dot probe task (and vice versa), and hence competitive or inhibitory 
processes elicited by these tendencies should be minimized. In support of this rationale, it is 
well-established that behavioral effects of interfering habitual responses are diminished 
when participants have the opportunity to anticipate such a conflict (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 
1982). Thus, external signals can be used to bias the relevant set of stimulus-response 
representations, leading to a reduction in response interference. Clear evidence of a conflict 
resolution process has also been shown in EEG experiments. These experiments show that 
neural markers of conflict resolution (e.g., N200) are activated at signals-of-conflict onset, 
with the magnitude of these markers drastically reduced during the actual conflicting trial 
(e.g., Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009). To further reduce interference between the two tasks, 
each task had a different set of responses which required the use of different hands.  
Splitting the two tasks into separate trials has a further advantage, in terms of 
minimizing the potential for overlap between task goals. We argued earlier that, in 
Experiment 1, the best strategy was to ignore cue identity until after the dot probe response 
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had been made, and only then to identify the cues in order to decide on the correct 
categorization response for the AL task. Indeed, participants were explicitly informed that 
they should ignore the cues until after they had responded to the dot probe. However, it is 
possible that (some) participants may have nevertheless prioritized the AL task and begun 
preparing their categorization response before the dot probe appeared. Under these 
conditions, task goals from the AL task—relating to the identity of the cues—may have ‘bled 
into’ the dot probe task. On this account, the pattern of response times for the dot probe 
task in Experiment 1 may have resulted from a goal-directed attentional strategy being 
applied to the AL task. Separating the dot probe and AL tasks in Experiment 2 (and explicitly 
informing forewarning participants of the task to be performed on each trial) allowed us to 
rule out this possibility. There was now no strategic reason at all for participants to encode 
cue identity on dot probe trials, since there was no upcoming categorization response to 
prepare on these trials. 
In sum, the procedure in Experiment 2 was designed to minimize the potential 
impact of any competition between the responses required by the different tasks, or to 
generalization of motor response inhibition. In addition, Experiment 2 provided a stronger 
test of the hypothesis that predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional capture are 
independent of participants’ ongoing task goals.   
 
Method 
Participants and apparatus. The AL task of Experiment 2 was easier for participants to learn 
as compared with Experiment 1 (see below). Therefore, we expected that not that many 
participants would fail to meet the data selection criteria. Hence, in order to equal the 
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number of ‘valid’ cases in each experiment (aiming 20-25 per condition), we reduced the 
number of participants in Experiment 2. Fifty-five UNSW Australia students participated for 
course credit. The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1. Since Experiment 2’s design 
needed fewer stimuli (see Table 2), only a subset of the stimuli were used (see Figure 1B; 
the subset of stimuli used in Experiment 2 are framed). 
Design.  The design was similar to that of Experiment 1 and included three phases: 
Pretraining, Phase 1 and Phase 2 (see Table 2). However, Experiment 2 involved half the 
number of cues and compounds as in Experiment 1; this made the AL stimulus-response 
contingencies much easier for participants to learn. Specifically, in Pretraining and Phase 1, 
participants encountered four different compounds and in Phase 2 there were two 
compounds. One of these compounds (p1 & n1 in Table 2) maintained a certain relationship 
with the AL response (i.e., R1 was the correct response on all Phase 2 trials of the AL task). 
The other compound, p2 & n2, transitioned to an uncertain relationship with the previously-
established AL response, R2. For example, for participants in the counterbalancing condition 
in which down was the correct response for p2 & n2 trials throughout Phase 1 (i.e., R2 was 
down), the correct response for this same compound was down on just two-thirds of the 
Phase 2 trials, and up (i.e., R1) was the correct response on the remaining one-third of trials. 
Cue locations and probe location were counterbalanced for each compound as in 
Experiment 1. The pretraining phase included six blocks, with each block comprising eight 
trials. Each block in Phase 1 comprised 16 dot probe and 16 AL trials, due to the 
counterbalancing of the probe position. There were seven blocks in Phase 1. Phase 2 
comprised 96 dot probe and 96 AL trials. As in Experiment 1, the additional number of trials 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 09
:14
 13
 M
ay
 20
16
 
25 
 
as compared with Phase 1 was needed in order to implement the probabilistic relationship 
of the uncertain condition. The SOA of the probe (250 ms or 1000 ms) was manipulated 
between-subjects. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. During Phase 1 and Phase 2, the AL and dot probe tasks were now programmed 
as independent, alternating trials. That is, the first trial of each phase involved only the AL 
task; the next trial involved only the dot probe task; the next trial returned to the AL task, 
and so on. In both tasks, corrective feedback was provided after every incorrect response.  
In order to distinguish the two tasks as clearly as possible, and with the aim of 
avoiding any response interference, the responses required in the different tasks were more 
distinct than in Experiment 1. For the dot probe task the responses were again the left and 
right arrow keys. However, the responses for the AL task were now the keys ‘A’ and ‘Z’. 
Participants were instructed to respond to the two tasks using different hands (left hand for 
the AL task and right hand for the dot probe task). 
The fixation cross at the start of each trial was replaced by a sign which indicated if 
the upcoming trial was going to be an AL trial or a dot probe trial. This sign appeared in the 
centre of the screen for 500 ms before the cues were presented. For the AL trials the sign 
was the letter ‘A’ above the letter ‘Z’; for the dot probe trials, the sign was two white arrows 
pointing left and right (see Figure 3A). These signs remained on the screen throughout each 
trial. The screen with the text ‘UP or DOWN?’ was not presented in AL trials, since the ‘A-Z’ 
sign worked as a reminder for the response options available in these trials. 
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Results and discussion 
Data pre-processing. We used the same selection criterion as in Experiment 1. As a 
consequence of this criterion, six participants were removed from the final sample (final N = 
49, with 25 participants in the short SOA condition). As in Experiment 1, RTs from trials with 
incorrect responses to the probe were not analysed. These responses amounted to 0.8% of 
all dot probe trials. As in Experiment 1, probe responses that were very fast (under 150 ms) 
or very slow (over 1000 ms) were also deleted (8% of all trials). Finally, dot probe trials with 
RTs lying more than 2.5 standard deviations from each participant’s mean were also 
excluded from analysis (0.5% of the remaining trials). 
Dot probe task: Response times. Figure 4 shows RTs to the probe averaged across blocks 
for Phases 1 and 2. Regarding the Phase 1 results, a 2 (SOA: short vs. long) x 2 
(Predictiveness: predictive vs. nonpredictive) ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
predictiveness, F(1, 47) = 14.86, p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ = .24, and a significant predictiveness x SOA 
interaction, F(1, 47) = 10.14, p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ = .18. The main effect of SOA was not significant, 
F(1, 47) = 2.14, p = .15, ߟ௣ଶ = .04. Paired t-tests at each level of SOA revealed significantly 
faster RTs when the probe was cued by a predictive stimulus than a nonpredictive stimulus 
in the short SOA condition, t(24) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 0.82, but not in the long SOA condition, 
t(23) = 0.70, p = .494, d = 0.14. This replicates the pattern observed in Experiment 1. It is 
notable that the effect size for this predictiveness effect in the short SOA condition (d = 
0.82) was similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (d = 0.78), despite the considerable 
procedural change of separating the two task components into distinct trials. 
Regarding the Phase 2 data, an ANOVA with factors of SOA, predictiveness, and 
uncertainty revealed a main effect of SOA, F(1,47) = 8.10, p = .007, ߟ௣ଶ = .15, with faster RTs 
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in the long SOA condition. There was also a main effect of uncertainty, F(1,47) = 7.40, p = 
.009, ߟ௣ଶ = .14, and a significant uncertainty x SOA interaction, F(1,47) = 18.22, p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ = 
.28. To examine this interaction further, comparisons were made between responses to 
certain and uncertain compounds within each SOA condition. This revealed that RTs were 
significantly faster to probes appearing over certain compounds than uncertain compounds 
in the short SOA condition, F(1,24) = 17.76, p < .001, ߟ௣ଶ= .42, but that there was no 
significant difference in the long SOA condition, F(1,23) = 2.03, p = .168, ߟ௣ଶ = .08. No other 
main effects or interactions in the omnibus ANOVA were significant (Fs < 1.1, ps> .3, ߟ௣ଶs < 
.03). 
Dot probe task: Accuracy. As in Experiment 1, we assessed whether effects detected on the 
RTs to the probe were due to speed-accuracy trade-offs. In general, the mean accuracy of 
dot probe responses was very high (M = .992, SEM = .002). Regarding Phase 1, a 2 (SOA) × 2 
(Predictiveness) ANOVA did not yield any significant effects [SOA: F(1, 47) = 0.75, p = .391, 
ߟ௣ଶ = .02; predictiveness: F(1, 47) = 3.21, p = .08, ߟ௣ଶ = .06; SOA x predictiveness interaction: 
F(1, 47) = 2.11, p = .153, ߟ௣ଶ= .04]. Note that the marginal effect of predictiveness reflects a 
pattern opposite to that expected by a speed-accuracy trade-off (predictive condition: M = 
.993, SEM = .002; nonpredictive condition: M = .989, SEM = .003). 
Regarding Phase 2, since we obtained an interaction between SOA and uncertainty 
factors in the RT results, we assessed any difference in accuracy regarding these two factors. 
A 2 (SOA) x 2 (Uncertainty) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects nor interactions, all 
Fs(1, 47) ≤ 2.77, ps ≥ .1, ߟ௣ଶs ≤ 0.06.  
To summarize, the dot probe data from Phase 1 replicate those of Experiment 1 in 
showing a performance advantage when the probe appeared in the location of a predictive 
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cue, rather than a nonpredictive cue, but only at the short SOA. This finding therefore offers 
converging evidence of an influence of within-compound differences in predictiveness on 
rapid attentional capture. Moreover, Experiment 2 replicated the influence of uncertainty 
on dot probe RTs in Phase 2, with slower responses when the probe was cued by an 
uncertain compound than a certain compound. Importantly, these effects were observed 
even though the associative learning and dot probe tasks were separated in Experiment 2; 
and indeed, effect sizes were larger than those observed in Experiment 1 despite this 
change. This suggests that these effects are not a product of response competition or 
response inhibition resulting from interference between the two tasks. Moreover, the 
findings of Experiment 2 results reinforce the hypothesis that effects of predictiveness- and 
uncertainty-driven attention occur independently of participants’ ongoing task goals.  
The results of Experiment 2 differed from those of Experiment 1 in two notable 
ways. Firstly, while the influence of uncertainty on Phase 2 dot probe responses did not 
differ significantly as a function of SOA in Experiment 1, the effect was significantly greater 
at short SOA than long SOA in Experiment 2. This discrepancy is discussed further in the 
General Discussion. Secondly, Experiment 2 did not find a significant effect of predictiveness 
on dot probe responses in Phase 2. This may be a consequence of reduced sensitivity in 
Experiment 2. Separating the tasks resulted in a general improvement in RT performance on 
the dot probe task in Experiment 2 (mean RT = 426 ms, as compared to 556 ms in 
Experiment 1). Consequently, response time may have been nearer to floor in Experiment 2, 
potentially reducing the sensitivity of the experiment to detect the more subtle effect of 
predictiveness.  
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General Discussion 
Recent research suggests that the ‘derived attention’ first described by James 
(1890/1983) can modulate the extent to which stimuli automatically capture attention in a 
way that is independent of the physical salience of those stimuli (Anderson, 2013; Awh, et 
al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Le Pelley et al. 2015). These studies have typically considered 
the impact of learning about the size of the reward that is associated with stimuli. The 
current study instead investigated the influence of learning about the variability of 
outcomes that are paired with stimuli; that is, learning about the uncertainty associated 
with stimuli. Previous research and theorizing suggests that such learning engages two 
related but distinct attentional mechanisms, which we refer to as predictiveness-driven (cf. 
Mackintosh, 1975) and uncertainty-driven (cf. Pearce and Hall, 1980) processes. The current 
study aimed to shed light on the nature of these mechanisms; in particular, whether they 
reflect rapid and relatively automatic, or slower and more controlled, attentional processes. 
 In two experiments, attention to cues was measured by using a dot probe task that 
was conducted jointly with an associative learning (AL) task. A learned predictiveness design 
was used for the AL task in both experiments, in which some cues were perfect predictors of 
the correct categorization response, while other cues were nonpredictive of the correct 
response. Our findings replicated those of Le Pelley et al. (2013) in demonstrating that 
probes appearing in the location of predictive cues elicited faster responses than probes 
appearing over non-predictive cues. In a second phase we manipulated the uncertainty 
surrounding some compound cues (with respect to the AL task) and observed a significant 
effect on response times to probes: when probes appeared over cues in uncertain 
compounds, responses to probes were significantly slower than when probes appeared over 
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cues in certain compounds. This novel effect of uncertainty did not interact with 
predictiveness: responses to probes over cues in uncertain compounds were slow for both 
the predictive and the nonpredictive cues.  
This pattern of results suggests that the perception of an uncertain compound 
initiates a mechanism which interferes with some of the processes needed for responding 
to the dot probe task (either detecting the probe, or executing the response). Experiment 2 
assessed whether the effect of uncertainty was mediated by an influence on response 
execution, by reducing the potential for interference between the AL and dot probe tasks. In 
this experiment, the AL and dot probe tasks occurred on separate and alternating trials, and 
participants were informed which type of task was to be completed before the trial began. 
To further reduce the potential interference between the two tasks, each task had a 
different set of responses which required the use of different hands. This manipulation was 
clearly successful in reducing response interference between the two tasks in that dot probe 
responses were generally faster in Experiment 2. Under these conditions, no effect of 
uncertainty was observed in the long (1000 ms) SOA condition. This suggests that the 
influence of uncertainty observed in the long SOA condition of Experiment 1 may have been 
a consequence of interference between the tasks. For instance, uncertain compounds could 
activate relatively slow controlled inhibitory mechanisms with the aim of diminishing the 
number of errors in the AL task. When the two tasks were separated in Experiment 2 this 
inhibitory mechanism would not have been engaged. 
Importantly, an uncertainty effect was observed in the short (250 ms) SOA 
condition of Experiment 2, and the magnitude of this effect was similar to that observed in 
Experiment 1. Given the separation of the two task components and the use of distinct 
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motor responses (left and right hands), we argue that this uncertainty effect is unlikely to 
have been produced by response interference. The observation of the effect in the 250ms 
SOA condition suggests instead that this attentional modulation was rapidly and 
automatically initiated by the presence of the uncertain cues. We describe this effect as 
automatic in nature since orienting attention to cues was not instructed in the dot probe 
task: there was no need for participants to identify the cue stimuli in order to respond 
rapidly to the probe, and furthermore participants were explicitly informed that they would 
gain no advantage by doing so. In other words, the attentional effects were observed 
despite the ongoing task goals of the dot-probe task (to attend centrally). The suggestion of 
an automatic influence is compatible with Experiment 2’s finding of an effect of uncertainty 
under a short prime–target SOA of 250 ms but not a long SOA of 1000 ms. Previous priming 
experiments have shown that the use of controlled response strategies is dramatically 
reduced under prime–target SOAs of 300 ms or shorter (e.g., Favreau & Segalowitz, 1983; 
Koivisto, 1997; Neely, 1977; Ortells, Fox, Noguera, & Abad, 2003; Pylkkänen & Marantz, 
2003; for a review, see Neely, 1991; for similar results in an associative learning procedure, 
see Morís, Cobos, Luque, & López, 2014). On this account, the pattern of dot probe 
responding observed at short SOA would reflect the rapid and automatic effect of 
uncertainty-driven attention. The longer SOA would allow time for participants to use 
controlled processes to move attention back to the centre of the screen, in line with the 
task demands of the dot probe task. 
We have described the modulation of attention by uncertainty as leading to an 
increase in attentional allocation, but yet we observed slower response times to probes over 
uncertain cues (at short SOA) in both experiments. This raises the possibility that one could 
interpret the data from the current Experiment 1 and 2 as indicating that those cues 
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associated with uncertainty automatically repel attention. By this account, the slower RTs to 
probes on uncertain trials are due to inattention to the cues in general. However, this 
account is inconsistent with the findings of Beesley et al. (2015), who showed (using eye-
tracking as a measure of attentional processing) that participants spent longer looking at 
cues in uncertain compounds as compared with cues in certain compounds; this is the 
opposite of the pattern that would be expected if cues associated with uncertainty repelled 
attention. 
So, Beesley et al. (2015) observed enhanced orienting to cues in uncertain 
compounds, while the current experiments demonstrate a deficit in probe detection for 
cues in uncertain compounds. How can we reconcile this difference, and what does this tell 
us about the nature of the uncertainty-driven attentional mechanism? We propose that 
uncertain cues automatically engage an exploratory process of information-gathering: when 
these cues appear, attention may be drawn to novel features of the stimuli that have not 
been processed in an attempt to resolve the prediction errors that have been associated 
with these cues on previous trials (producing the difference in orienting reported by Beesley 
et al.). Assuming that this exploratory process must be engaged before any response actions 
are initiated, this account would also explain the increase in dot probe RTs for cues in 
uncertain compounds observed in the current experiments. In other words, on this account 
responses to the probe were slowed down because participants’ cognitive resources were 
consumed with a process of exploration for new information from the cues. 
Expanding on this idea, Figure 1 shows that the shapes used as cues in these 
experiments differ in two important respects. Firstly, and most obviously, the stimuli 
differed in colour. It thus seems likely that participants used colour to distinguish between 
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predictive and nonpredictive cues during Phase 1. However, some shapes also differed in 
the thickness of the ‘spikes’ which projected from the central circle, although these 
differences were clearly less salient than the differences in colour (see Wang, Yu, & Zhou, 
2013). If the introduction of uncertainty in Phase 2 did indeed promote exploration of 
hitherto-unexplored differences in stimulus features, it seems possible that these spikes 
might constitute such features. Consistent with this idea, previous work in categorization 
has shown that changes in attention to the values of a low-salience attribute occur only 
after the values of another, more salient attribute have already been associated with 
categories (Kersten, Goldstone, & Schaffert, 1998). Future experimental work will test this 
account in several ways, for example by manipulating the complexity of the stimuli so as to 
promote or hinder this exploratory process, or by using forced choice recognition tests 
against similar foils to test for enhanced memory for different features of uncertain cues. 
In a sense, the effect of uncertainty on attentional processing observed in the 
current experiments might be thought of as a manifestation of the orienting response (OR) 
to stimuli in animals (e.g., Kaye & Pearce, 1984a, 1984b; Pearce & Kaye, 1985). The OR was 
first defined by Pavlov (1927) as an investigatory reflexive response to new stimuli. More 
recently it has been shown that an OR is elicited not only to new stimuli, but also to cues 
that have recently been associated with prediction error (e.g., Kaye & Pearce, 1984a). Kaye 
and Pearce (1984b) also showed that the OR operated at the level of the cue-compound: if a 
compound of two cues included a novel cue and a reliable predictive cue, the OR to the 
compound was weak and rapidly decreased with further training. Thus, the influence of 
uncertainty found in the current experiments could be explained as the consequence of an 
automatic OR elicited by uncertain compounds. This account can also be reconciled with the 
notion that uncertain stimuli receive enhanced processing in an information-gathering 
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process: the initiation of an OR would slow down any subsequent responses since attention 
is focused on the processing of the lesser-known characteristics of the cues (i.e., the 
peripheral spikes of our cues).  
This account of the effect of uncertainty has implications for attentional theories of 
associative learning. In essence, we are proposing that the experience of an associative 
prediction error has two different consequences. Firstly, the associative strength of the 
cue(s) involved will change as a result of an error-correcting learning mechanism, and this 
may lead to a reduction in the perceived salience of those cues in line with the reduction in 
their predictiveness. Secondly, and likely in parallel, experience of a prediction error will 
increase the likelihood that the agent will show an automatic OR to stimuli (or features of 
the stimuli) that are less well-explored, in line with the increase in the uncertainty regarding 
the predictive status of those stimuli. This pattern of changes in attention caused by an 
error signal is not easily reconciled with current attentional theories of associative learning. 
For instance, dual-process models (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010) 
incorporate two salience parameters, one determined by learned predictiveness and the 
other by uncertainty. Although the rules by which these parameters change are different, 
both parameters have the same effects on behavior: they modulate the likelihood that 
selective attention will be allocated to a cue, and—as a consequence—modify the rate of 
learning about the cue. Thus, both forms of attention would facilitate rapid orienting to cues 
(which should produce rapid responses in a dot probe task), and would also facilitate new 
learning about these cues in new contexts. Our results seem to point towards a more radical 
differentiation between uncertainty- and predictiveness-driven attention. The current data 
show that uncertainty-driven attention does not facilitate rapid responses. On the contrary, 
it slows down responses because attention appears to be focused on an information-
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seeking process, diverting resources away from processing of and/or responding to other 
stimuli (such as the dot probe target) appearing in the same location. Further evidence for a 
distinction between the behavioural effects of predictiveness-driven and uncertainty-driven 
attention comes from the existing literature. While demonstrations of an influence of 
predictiveness-driven attention on the rate of learning about cues are abundant, there is 
very little evidence of a similar effect of uncertainty-driven attention on learning rate in 
studies of humans (Beesley et al., 2015; Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers, & Knipe, 
2010; for a recent review, see Le Pelley, Mitchell et al., in press).2 Hence, it seems that 
predictiveness-driven and uncertainty-driven processes may reflect two distinct 
mechanisms, which impact upon behavior in different ways. Specifically, we suggest that 
predictiveness-driven attention is appropriately characterized by a change in the perceived 
salience of a cue, wherein more predictive cues have higher salience, and hence are learned 
about more rapidly. On the other hand, uncertainty-driven attention would increase after 
prediction errors, and engage the agent in a resource-limiting attentional exploration 
process, where previously ignored cues or features of the environment are attended in a 
search for further information. It remains for future research to establish whether, and if so 
under what circumstances, this exploration process influences the salience of the explored 
(and non-explored) stimulus features, and the rate of subsequent learning about them. It 
seems likely that these influences may be moderated by such factors as stimulus complexity 
and changes in context (for further discussion, see Le Pelley, Mitchell et al., in press). 
To sum up, we have shown in the current experiments that attention to cues is 
rapidly and automatically modulated by predictiveness-driven and uncertainty-driven 
attention. This constitutes a considerable challenge to the usual characterization of 
uncertainty-driven attentional mechanism as the output of a controlled top-down 
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mechanism (Pearce & Hall, 1980). Exploration is usually considered as a volitional behaviour, 
a “…refined capacity, demanding careful regulation.” (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & 
Dolan, 2006, p. 876). In a similar vein, exploratory behaviors are usually portrayed as 
voluntary actions which “…temporarily suspend routine stimulus-based control and switch 
the control of the motor apparatus from sensory to volitional input.” (Haggard, 2008, p. 
938). In addition, imaging studies have found that exploratory actions are positively 
correlated with an increase in the activity of prefrontal cortex systems (e.g., Badre, Doll, 
Long, & Frank, 2012; Daw et al., 2006). Since these areas have previously been associated 
with cognitive control, these results reinforce the idea that exploration-related behaviours 
are the consequence of a rational, controlled decision-making mechanism (e.g., Daw, Niv, & 
Dayan, 2005). Our results for the first time challenge these ideas, suggesting that 
exploration can be initiated very rapidly and in a relatively automatic way.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 Here, we follow recent literature (e.g., Feldmann-Wüstefeld et al., 2015; Shone, 
Harris, & Livesey, 2015) in taking automatic as a synonym for ‘independent of ongoing 
task goals’ (see also Awh et al., 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). We also use 
automatic to indicate the rapid nature of the effects (e.g., Evans, 2008). The results 
that we report in this article are compatible with these two characteristics of 
automaticity. However, we note that stricter definitions of automaticity do exist. For 
instance, other characterizations of automaticity require that the effect should be, not 
only independent of the actual goals, but also counterproductive (Perlman & Tzelgov, 
2005). The procedures used in the current experiments do not allow us to determine 
whether our effects would still be considered automatic under such stricter criteria. 
 
2 Notably, studies with nonhuman animals provide stronger evidence for an influence 
of uncertainty on learning rate (e.g., Kaye & Pearce, 1984a; Haselgrove, Esber, Pearce, 
& Jones, 2010). Indeed, it has been proposed that attentional mechanisms relating to 
uncertainty could differ fundamentally across species (Haselgrove et al., 2010). Do
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Panel A shows the trial structure for Phases 1 and 2 of Experiment 1. Participants 
were instructed to respond the position of the probe (left or right) as fast as possible. This 
probe was presented 250 or 1000 ms after cue onset, depending on the SOA condition. 
After the dot probe response, participants made a predictive response for the associative 
learning task (up or down). If this predictive response was incorrect, error feedback was 
provided (not shown). Panel B shows the eight stimuli used as cues. The four stimuli also 
used for Experiment 2 are framed. Mean response times (panel C) and mean proportions of 
‘probable outcome’ responses (panel D) are shown for the associative learning task. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Figure 2. Mean response times to the probe in the Experiment 1. The upper panel shows 
results in the short SOA condition (SOA = 250 ms); the lower panel shows results for the 
long SOA condition (SOA = 1000 ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Figure 3. Panel A shows the trial structure for the associative learning task (top) and the dot 
probe task (bottom). Feedback was provided when participants made an error on the 
associative learning task (feedback screen not shown). Panel B shows the mean response 
times and panel C shows the proportion of ‘probable outcome’ responses for the associative 
learning task. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Figure 4. Mean response times to the probe in Experiment 2. The upper panel shows results 
in the short SOA condition (SOA = 250 ms); the lower panel shows results for the long SOA 
condition (SOA = 1000 ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Table 1. Experiment 1 design 
Pretraining Phase 1 Phase 2 
4 blocks x 8 trials 8 blocks x 32 trials 96 trials 
Only associative 
learning task Dot probe task and associative learning task 
p1 & n1 → R1 
p1 & n2 → R1 
p2 & n1 → R2 
p2 & n2 → R2 
p3 & n3 → R1 
p3 & n4 → R1 
p4 & n3 → R2 
p4 & n4 → R2 
p1 & n1 → R1 
p1 & n2 → R1 
p2 & n1 → R2 
p2 & n2 → R2 
p3 & n3→ R1 
p3 & n4→ R1 
p4 & n3→ R2 
p4 & n4 → R2 
Certain compounds 
p1 & n1 → R1 
p2 & n2 → R2 
Uncertain compounds 
p3 & n3 → R1 (67%) / R2 (33%) 
p4 & n4 → R2 (67%) / R1 (33%) 
 
Note.  p1–p4 denote cues that were predictive with regard to the associative learning task 
during Pretraining and Phase 1; n1–n4 denote cues that were nonpredictive. R1 and R2 
denote the correct categorization response for each cue-compound (up and down, 
counterbalanced). During Phase 2, Certain compounds are those for which the same 
categorization response was correct through Phase 2; Uncertain compounds are those for 
which one categorization response was correct on two-thirds of appearances in Phase 2, 
while the other response was correct on one-third of appearances. The probe was equally 
likely to appear in the location of all cues during Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
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Table 2.Experiment 2 design 
Pretraining Phase 1 Phase 2 
6 blocks x 8 trials 7 blocks x 16 trials 96 trials 
Only associative 
learning task 
Dot probe task and associative learning task 
p1 & n1 → R1 
p1 & n2 → R1 
p2 & n1 → R2 
p2 & n2 → R2 
p1 & n1 → R1 
p1 & n2 → R1 
p2 & n1 → R2 
p2 & n2 → R2 
Certain compound 
p1 & n1 → R1 
Uncertain compound 
p2 & n2 → R2 (67%) / R1 (33%) 
 
Note.  p1–p2 denote cues that were predictive during Pretraining and Phase 1; n1–n2 
denote cues that were nonpredictive. R1 and R2 denote the correct categorization response 
for each cue-compound (up and down, counterbalanced). During Phase 2, Certain 
compounds are those for which the same categorization response was correct throughout 
Phase 2; Uncertain compounds are those for which one categorization response was correct 
on two-thirds of appearances in Phase 2, while the other response was correct on one-third 
of appearances. The probe was equally likely to appear in the location of all cues during 
Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
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